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Although it seems intuitively clear that candidate quality provides a critical pillar of demo-
cratic governance, the consequences of electing low-quality politicians remain unclear. Combin-
ing census data and election results, we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis to examine
the socioeconomic effects of criminal politicians in India. We find that the election of state
legislators with criminal charges can exacerbate household poverty in a village as household
electrification and literacy rates both decrease when criminal candidates win close elections
against non-criminal ones. In contrast, the presence of criminal politicians does not have a
conclusive negative effect on the supply of local infrastructures, such as paved roads and power
grids. These results highlight the importance of differentiating between different types of policy
outcomes. Rent-seeking politicians will engage in local infrastructural projects, but they may
pay little attention to these projects’ contribution to poverty reduction.




Theories of democratic governance highlight the importance of candidate quality (see Caselli and
Morelli, 2004; Besley, 2005; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose, 2011). Ideally, electoral competition
allows citizens to fill public offices with honest and capable candidates and hold them accountable.1
However, in real life, asymmetric information and other issues have prevented voters from monitor-
ing politicians and evaluating their performance (Ferejohn, 1986; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin,
1999). While electoral accountability through “sanctioning of poor performance” should bring good
government, democratic institutions also leave scope for candidate characteristics to shape policy
outcomes.
In this vein, the electoral success of candidates with criminal charges in democratic countries is
disturbing. As Banerjee et al. (2014) note, “[i]n practice... even countries with competitive elections
described as free and fair by outside observers routinely elect large numbers of officials who are
believed to be corrupt or prone to illegal conduct.” Similarly, indicates Vaishnav (2017), “[i]n
India,... [o]nce voting is over and the results are announced, a ... wave of stories about the criminal
records of those who are actually elected pours forth.” This phenomenon has drawn attention from
scholars, who have used newly available data on criminal charges against candidates to understand
why people elect them and what they do once elected (Chemin, 2012; Fisman, Schulz, and Vig,
2014; Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal, 2014; Aidt, Golden, and Tiwari, 2015).2
But how concerned should we be about criminal politicians? Several scholars have maintained
that criminal politicians can strengthen grassroots governance as they can provide local public
goods (e.g., community security) that the formal state has failed to offer (see Vaishnav, 2017).
Some suggest that criminal politicians are harmful to the society (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2014; Aidt,
Golden, and Tiwari, 2015), but the evidence turns out to be thin. Few rigorous studies have sought
to estimate the socioeconomic effects of the election of criminal politicians, but they shed little
light on how political criminality might compromise democratic policymaking and implementation.
1Following Besley (2005), we distinguish between honesty/integrity and competence as the two principal dimensions
of candidate quality.
2Most existing studies focus on India, but few have analyzed criminal politicians in Italy (Mastrorocco and Di
Cataldo, 2016), the United Kingdom (Larcinese and Sircar, 2013), and the Philippines (Magno, 2010).
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For instance, Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal (2014) employ the regression discontinuity design and
show that the election of criminal candidates causes night-time luminosity – a proxy for the volume
of economic activity – to decrease. While their focus is of clear policy and normative importance,
they focus on criminal politicians’ impact on overall economic activity instead of policy-specific
outcomes. Their findings may conceal crucial variation in the effects of criminal politicians on
different dependent variables.
We depart from existing studies by arguing that criminality will not always have an adverse
impact. Local infrastructure projects provide ample opportunities for rent-seeking and, therefore,
criminal politicians have incentives to introduce them. Meanwhile, we expect to observe negative
effects on the provision of household amenities. Criminal politicians find them less attractive
because investments in household electrification and education do not require large-scale projects
with the opportunities for rent accumulation, and programs that target individuals make it more
difficult for politicians to divert resources for personal gain (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006b).
To illustrate, we estimate the causal effects of criminality on local public good provision and
development outcomes in rural India. In 2003, India’s Election Commission required all candidates
to submit signed affidavits that reveal their educational qualifications, pending criminal charges, and
assets (see Sastry, 2014). Merging the affidavits with state election results and village-level census
data in 2001 and 2011, we assemble a dataset of nearly 600,000 observations to identify the effects
of electing criminal candidates from the regression discontinuity analysis of close elections (Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008; Lee, 2008; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Snyder, Folke, and Hirano, 2015).3 We
focus on state assembly elections between 2004 and 2010, and examine how the electoral success of
criminal candidates in close elections shapes different village-level socioeconomic outcomes.
We find that the electoral success of criminal candidates has complex effects. The electing of
a criminal candidate in a close election to become a Member of State Assembly (MLA) does not
appear to impede local infrastructure construction. The estimated coefficients on village electrifi-
cation and road construction are close to zero and statistically insignificant. In contrast, criminal
politicians do seem to undermine poverty alleviation, as both household electrification and literacy
3See Section 5 to see the definitions of close elections.
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rate decline when criminals are voted into office. The coefficients for these outcomes are consistently
large, negative, and mostly statistically significant. When we consider candidates with “serious”
accusations, such as assault, murder, kidnap, rape, and corruption,4 we find similar results.
We also study different heterogeneous effects of candidate criminality. First, we explore the
impact of education, a popular candidate characteristic in the literature (see Carnes and Lupu,
2016) – controlling for education does not change the estimates. This result suggests that criminality
itself, as opposed to pending criminal charges being correlated with other candidate characteristics,
is driving the primary findings. Next, we find that criminal politicians hampered road construction
when they did not come from the political party of the Chief Minister in the state. This finding
illuminates a causal mechanism driving our results: aligned criminal politicians use their connections
to secure funds for road construction, while unaligned criminal politicians are unable to do so
(e.g., Lehne, Shapiro, and Eynde, 2016). Lastly, we compare the effects of criminal politicians on
villages with different caste compositions to investigate whether criminality contributes to increased
socioeconomic inequality – the negative effects of criminal politicians are not differentiated by the
caste composition of a village. When a criminal politician is elected, villages with varying size of
scheduled castes and tribes are equally hurt. The adverse effects of criminal politicians on rural
development apply widely, from socially privileged to the most marginalized communities.
We also consider the quality of road construction. Using data from a national road construction
scheme, we find that criminal politicians reduce the quality of projects, as assessed by independent
inspectors. They also reduce the occurrence of inspections by national authorities, most likely in an
effort to conceal low-quality construction due to corruption. These results are consistent with our
argument that the ambiguous effect of criminal politicians on infrastructure results from reduced
quality off-setting the increased incentive to secure investments.
Our study offers two contributions. We propose and test new hypotheses about the impact
of candidate quality. While the literature has focused on aggregate economic outcomes, we not
only provide causal estimates of the effects across different types of development and infrastructure
programs but also consider the distributional implications of candidate quality. We thus answer a
4See Section 4 for more discussion on the definition of serious crimes.
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call by Kramon and Posner (2013) to theorize how political factors influence the provision of different
local public goods and services.5 Our findings delineate a more nuanced picture of candidate
quality and human development, moving the empirical literature on political selection beyond
simple associations between candidate quality and economic growth (e.g., Besley, Montalvo, and
Reynal-Querol, 2011; Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal, 2014; Carnes and Lupu, 2016).
We also join recent studies that seek to understand the presence of criminals in elected offices
and their impact on democratic governance in India (e.g. Banerjee et al., 2014; Fisman, Schulz, and
Vig, 2014; Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal, 2014; Aidt, Golden, and Tiwari, 2015; Vaishnav, 2017).
We show that electing criminals or other low-quality candidates, while generating negative effects
on household-level outcomes, does not have a clear-cut adverse impact effect on infrastructure
projects. While the presence of criminal politicians can result in lower-quality projects or excessive
use of public resources, our findings question the notion that the people living in these areas would
themselves face reductions in overall local infrastructure. Hence, India’s criminal politicians may
be less of a threat to growth in general than to “inclusive” growth (see Drèze and Sen, 2002).
2 Democratic Governance and Candidate Quality
Democratic institutions are designed to hold politicians accountable and maintain the quality of
government through competitive elections. However, existing studies have discussed various vot-
ers’ challenges in monitoring their elected representatives, given that politicians are often better
informed than voters and face the temptation to abuse their power for private gain or to the advan-
tage of special interest groups (e.g., Ferejohn, 1986; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 1997; Besley
and Burgess, 2002; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2006a).
While it is crucial to help voters make more informed choices by increasing government trans-
parency, sound democratic governance thus also rests upon elections being able to select honest
and competent candidates. Candidate quality has received considerable attention as a critical fac-
tor of democratic governance. As Besley (2005: 45) writes, “if the control of politicians through
5With a focus on India, Lee (2018) shows that the electoral victory of women politicians will lead to the provision
of high-quality latrines.
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elections is limited, then improving the quality of government requires an increase in the honesty,
integrity or competence of those who are elected.” Indeed, a formal model of “bad” politicians by
Caselli and Morelli (2004) posits that dishonest politicians are eager to win elections as they value
the opportunities to extract private rents from the public office. Our analysis of candidates with
criminal charges speaks to the question of honesty and integrity, as criminal records can indicate
less for both and thus a higher propensity of corruption.
The empirical evidence on candidate quality largely comes from studies that examine the vari-
ation in socioeconomic development outcomes as a function of election results. In particular, many
studies use education as a proxy for candidate quality (e.g. Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol,
2011; Brollo et al., 2013; Baltrunaite et al., 2014). However, as Carnes and Lupu (2016: 36) note,
“there simply is not much empirical research on the link between politicians educational attainment
and their performance in office.” The lack of empirical evidence applies broadly to the relationship
between a candidate’s characteristics and her performance in office, as measuring candidate quality
without relying on the education proxy has been a daunting task. Besides educational attainment,
few other objective indicators of candidate quality are available.
In the case of India, studies such as Aidt, Golden, and Tiwari (2015), Banerjee et al. (2014),
and Vaishnav (2017) focus on the electoral performance of criminal politicians. Our study aligns
with those exploring the consequences of electing criminals or other corrupt candidates. Meanwhile,
while Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2014) find that elected politicians accumulate assets faster than
their losing peers in corrupt states and note that the “results are consistent with a rent-seeking
explanation,” they do not quantify the cost of such rent-seeking endeavors for the society. Vaishnav
(2017) explains why Indian voters often support criminal candidates, but his analysis does not
identify the causal effects of criminal politicians.
Chemin (2012) is among the first to study the relationship between electing criminal politicians
and rural development. He examines the household expenditure of non-Brahmin households in
2004 across 180 administrative districts, showing a negative effect on household consumption from
a regression discontinuity analysis. Using constituency-level election data, Prakash, Rockmore, and
Uppal (2014) conduct another regression discontinuity analysis, showing that criminal politicians
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are causally associated with decreases in lighting at night. The authors interpret the results as
decreases in economic activity. Our study is different from both approaches in that we theorize
about and empirically examine a range of direct measures of both socioeconomic development and
infrastructure programs across inhabited villages in India. Moreover, we consider heterogeneous
effects as a function of pre-existing village and candidate characteristics to explore if criminal
politicians have distributional implications across constituencies. Finally, we use more refined data
on election outcomes over a long period of time and over a larger area of India.6
3 Theory and Hypotheses
We begin with the premise that individuals with criminal charges mostly disregard the rule of law
and are prompted to engage in corrupt rent-seeking endeavors when running for elected politi-
cians (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2014; Fisman, Schulz, and Vig, 2014; Aidt, Golden, and Tiwari, 2015;
Vaishnav, 2017). Following Besley (2005), we also perceive criminality an indicator of self-interest.
Altogether, criminality itself does not have a direct impact on the outcomes of interest. Instead,
criminality allows us to measure characteristics of politicians whose corrupt, self-interested behav-
iors do influence outcomes.7
We propose that the election of criminal candidates does not always cause an adverse impact
on human development. More specifically, we argue that criminal politicians undermine household
poverty alleviation; elected representatives with criminal charges, however, do not necessarily hinder
the construction of local public facilities. While the lack of integrity inherent in criminal politicians
can undermine their incentives to channel resources for rural development to individual households,
this negative effect is partially offset by their keen interest in reaping rents from infrastructure
projects.
In India, the local impact of elected representatives can manifest itself through politicians’
6Gehring, Kauffeldt, and Vadlamannati (2016) also seek to estimate the effect of electing criminal politicians into
office on their legislative effort and the use of local development funds, but they focus on criminal politicians in Lok
Sabha, the national parliament, instead of state assemblies.
7In the Indian context, a robust democratic constitution and a series of anti-corruption laws imply that the legal
system and regulations governing political activity are themselves of relatively high quality. The problem is that
many politicians circumvent the rules and engage in illegal activities, and the criminal character of a politician is thus
a good indicator of these inherent character traits. In contrast, in a country with biased laws on paper, willingness
to break the law might not say anything about self-interest or a lack of respect for the rule of law.
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ability to secure and allocate resources for their constituencies (Jensenius, 2015; Gehring, Kauffeldt,
and Vadlamannati, 2016; Asher and Novosad, 2017). Although individual Members of Legislative
Assembly (MLAs) have limited capacity to legislate under India’s strict party discipline, they do
have access to funds to pursue various goals at the grassroots level, ranging from rural development
to rent seeking. These resources were embedded in India’s clientelistic machinery, which the then-
dominant Indian Congress Party built in the 1960s to facilitate the exchange of resources for votes
(Weiner, 1967; Piliavsky, 2014).
For instance, most Indian states provide each MLA with Local Area Development Scheme,
which the MLAs can employ for any purposes they deem fit (Malhotra and Jain, 2009).8 In
each constituency, an MLA plays a crucial role in allocating government funds, grading contracts
of local public infrastructure, and appointing local bureaucrats – including the influential Block
Development Officer (Witsoe, 2012; Jensenius, 2015). As Jensenius (2015: 197) notes, “politicians
spend most of their time in their home constituencies, where they work to expand their support-base
by helping individuals get benefits they are entitled to, facilitating access to governmental schemes,
putting pressure on the bureaucracy to implement development works, or by lobbying political allies
and business contacts to bring projects to their area.” We draw on this logic and theorize about
how criminal candidates shape outcomes when elected to State Legislative Assemblies.
Jensenius (2015: 201) notes several other channels that MLAs can use to shape local develop-
ment. Because these politicians tend to spend most of their time in their home district, “they work
to expand their support-base by helping individuals get benefits they are entitled to, facilitating
access to governmental schemes, putting pressure on the bureaucracy to implement development
works, or by lobbying political allies and business contacts to bring projects to their area.” These
channels, which are only partially formal and rely heavily on connections and social standing,
underscore the MLA’s role as a local promoter of public works and champion of individuals and
families in need of help. According to Vaishnav (2017), “many of the bad habits and customs
of the License Raj remain deeply entrenched in India,” as cumbersome licensing and permitting
8Researchers have also noticed that some MLAs do not spend their allotted funds in constituencies. As Keefer and
Khemani (2009) highlight, an MLA’s effort of delivering pork will be lower in constituencies when these constituencies
are their party’s stronghold, perhaps because politicians would like to focus their resources on swing voters. We include
fixed effects in our analysis to account for this caveat.
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procedures give bureaucrats, whose career fortunes are in turn controlled by politicians, excessive
power over private business.
3.1 Criminal Politicians and Local Infrastructure
Local politicians usually have a genuine interest in public infrastructure projects within their con-
stituencies because these projects can act as a major source of rent-seeking. In Indonesia, Olken
(2007) finds that road construction in the absence of regular, rigorous government audits see signif-
icant cost increases because of corruption. Even in industrialized countries such as Japan, official
corruption and organized crime have pervaded the construction industry (Woodall, 1996). While
not focusing specifically on criminal politicians, Lehne, Shapiro, and Eynde (2016) find that con-
tractors sharing the surname of a politician – a proxy for informal social connections in India’s
stratified, hierarchical society – are more likely to secure large payments for projects without cor-
responding improvements in the quality of the roads constructed.
Vaishnav (2017) introduces the example of Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy (known as YSR). Hailing
from the Kadap district of Andhra Pradesh, YSR used his family’s mining revenue to build a local
stronghold that guaranteed landslide victories in elections over time. He first scored an MLA seat
in 1978, and by 2004 had become the state’s Chief Minister. Throughout his tenure, he abused his
office to give land allotments to businesses that agreed to invest in his son Jagan’s empire. These
businesses, in turn, did well because their projects circumvented regulatory review and purchased
state assets at a significant discount.
Another example from Vaishnav (2017) is the Adarsh Housing Society in Mumbai, which was
built in 1999 for widows of soldiers who fought in 1999 in Kargil against Pakistan but turned into
free flats for politicians, bureaucrats, and regulators. The housing complex failed to comply with
zoning and environmental rules, as state politicians – including cabinet ministers – controlled com-
plicit bureaucrats who ignored the rules governing residential construction and diverted extremely
expensive flats to influential people.
In line with the literature, we argue that candidate criminality will have a negative impact
on the quality of local infrastructure projects while not necessarily undermining their availability
within the constituencies. According to Kenny (2007), bribery and kickbacks in local infrastructure
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construction, which act as an adverse drain on public resources, induce criminal politicians to
secure and implement construction projects. Since politicians focus more on putting these projects
in place than assuring the benefits that public infrastructure brings to the local community, their
rent-seeking attempts undermine quality, compromise environmental and social safeguards, and
even cause deaths and injuries through increased accidents during and after construction.
While we are not aware of any micro-level studies in this regard, Keefer and Knack (2007:
566) find that “public investment rises when governments have greater incentives to seek rents.” A
pioneering study by Mauro (1998) shows that corrupt governments shift expenditures away from
education to other uses. He argues that the reason for the negative association between corrup-
tion and education spending is that spending on education “does not provide as many lucrative
opportunities for government officials as other components of spending do” (Mauro, 1998: 265).
Mastrorocco and Di Cataldo (2016) show that when mafia penetrates municipal government in
Italy, spending shifts into activities such as construction and waste management that generate
rents, while tax collection and policing decline.
On balance, criminal politicians should have no definite effect on the implementation of local
public infrastructure projects overall. First, a criminal politician might compromise the quality of
projects because of corruption, along the lines of Olken (2007): if the politician awards projects to
incompetent contractors in exchange for bribes and the bidding competition declines accordingly,
the quality of the projects suffers. As a result, criminal politicians may reduce the input-output
efficiency of infrastructure projects. Next, criminal politicians’ pursuit of installing local infrastruc-
ture in the first place means that the reduced quality may be at least partially canceled out by a
positive local scale effect.9 In the Indian case, although the average quality of any given project
is lower under a criminal MLA, the increased number of projects can compensate for the reduced
quality.10
Hypothesis 1. The supply of local infrastructure is unaffected when a criminal candidate wins an
9A positive scale effect does not mean that criminal politicians do not have an overall adverse effect. A positive
local scale effect could come at the expense of areas governed by non-criminal politicians in a zero-sum game of
resource allocation.
10Here, of course, we must remember that such an increase in the number of projects does imply inefficient resource
use and possibly the implementation of fewer projects in other areas of the country.
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election.
3.2 Criminal Politicians and Household Poverty
Unlike local infrastructure, we argue that criminal politicians undermine household poverty allevi-
ation and rural development. The reason is twofold. First, criminal politicians lack a compelling
self-interest in these outcomes. Using criminality as the indicator for the latent characteristic of
self-interest, the share of dedicated public servants motivated by an intrinsic interest in improving
the well-being of the poor is lower among criminal than among non-criminal politicians. As Chemin
(2012: 669) explains, criminals candidates are usually not interested in alleviating poverty because
these politicians prioritize abuse of power for their self-interest.
According to Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal (2014: 4), who cite a large body of literature on
corruption (e.g., Bardhan, 1997), “[c]orruption has its adverse effects not just on static efficiency but
also on investment and growth.” If criminal candidates are more likely to divert public resources for
private use and/or offer contracts to low-quality contractors, their behavior sacrifices the efficiency
of public policies enacted to mitigate poverty. Even if an Indian state government wants to invest
in poverty alleviation, for example, a powerful criminal politician’s presence complicates implemen-
tation. The criminal politician diverts resources for economic and political gain, whereas a more
honest politician would allocate more resources to meet the actual goals of the policy: poverty
alleviation and human development.
Criminal politicians are interested in poverty alleviation to the extent that it promises electoral
gains. This incentive is the same for both criminal and non-criminal politicians, however, as any
office-seeking politician will seek to secure electoral support (e.g., Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986).
Even an altruistic politician would be office-seeking because an electoral defeat would prevent the
altruist from enacting his or her preferred policies. Therefore, criminal politicians tend to downplay
poverty alleviation not only because they lack the spirit of public service but also because poverty
alleviation does not promise the kind of rampant rents that motivate criminal candidates in the
first place.
In the extreme, criminal politicians may even prefer to collude with local elites to undermine
the provision of local public goods. Economic growth, literacy, and social policies can empower
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the poor and thus reduce criminal politicians’ ability to win elections in the future. Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2006b), in their study on pro-poor programs in West Bengal, explain that it is usually
difficult for corrupt officials to reap rents from household-level poverty alleviation programs, as
citizens entitled to the privileges are incentivized to detect deviations in policy implementation.
Hypothesis 2. Household poverty increases when a criminal candidate wins an election.
The abuse of political office for private gain can be flagrant. According to a Wall Street Journal
interview with Anurag Yadav, a Chief Development Officer for Lucknow, the state capital of Uttar
Pradesh: “In one scam, a member of the national parliament provided 2.5 million rupees, or about
$60,000, through an NGO to help construct the villa of an Uttar Pradesh state legislator facing 20
criminal cases, including murder. In another, a politician used public funds to build a nursing home
only to rent it out for weddings, collecting the fees.”11 Here, criminal politicians are merely using
public funds for their own sake rather than promoting rural development and alleviating poverty.
Raja Bhaiya, an Uttar Pradesh politician notorious for his criminal activities, illustrates these
tendencies (Vaishnav, 2017). According to one of his former aides, this longtime gangster had the
aide collect bribes worth USD 200,000 per week between 2004 and 2007 from food aid provided by
the state. This money, intended to reduce hunger among the state’s poorest, instead enriched a
criminal politician.
4 Criminal Candidates in Indian State Elections
In 2003, the Election Commission of India issued the order that mandates all candidates running
for elections to submit public affidavits. Every affidavit should include a candidate’s past criminal
charges, educational qualifications, and personal assets. The website myneta.info managed by
the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) in Delhi publishes all affidavits for state assembly
elections after 2004.
In using data on candidate characteristics as a proxy for their quality, it is important to consider
a few challenges in regard to the notion of criminal charges. In India, pending criminal charges
against a candidate could be politically motivated, and so it is possible that opposition candidates,
11“Lawless Legislators Thwart Social Progress in India,” May 4, 2007, Wall Street Journal, available at http:
//www.wsj.com/articles/SB117823755304891604 (accessed August 17, 2016).
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in particular, are targeted.12 In light of this caveat, we replicate our analysis focusing only on
“serious” criminal charges. The Delhi-based ADR defines a serious criminal politician as one who
has been charged with any offense for which maximum punishment is of five years or more, any
non-bailable offense, any electoral offense (e.g., bribery), any offense related to loss to exchequer,
any offenses related to assault, murder, kidnap, rape, any offenses stipulated in Representation
of the People Act (Section 8), any offenses under Prevention of Corruption Act, and any crimes
against women.13 Because such charges are difficult to fabricate, they offer a conservative approach
to identifying the effects of criminal politicians.14
Table 1 provides an overview of criminal state assembly candidates for the full sample and close
elections with varying margins of victory. We break down the distribution of criminal candidates
by state, party affiliation, education, gender, and caste.15 In the full sample, most winning criminal
politicians are from Bihar, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh. According to the 2011 Census, these
are the most populous states in India. Jharkhand stands out as exceptional given that the state
only has less than 3% of the Indian population. These states are also four of the poorest in the
country (Bose, 2013).
Nearly 40% of criminal politicians come from parties with national presence, such as the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC). Another 8.4% are affili-
ated with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a party devoting to the well-being of scheduled castes.
Furthermore, similar to their non-criminal peers, the majority of criminal politicians (70%) do not
have college degrees. Nearly all winning politicians are male. Finally, more than three quarters of
criminal politicians are found in general constituencies. The patterns described are very similar to
12The same concern also applies to the self-reported educational qualifications. See, for example, “5 Indian Politi-
cians Shrouded in Fake Degree Scandals,” New Indian Express, June 9, 2015.
13Non-serious cases include charges such as trespassing, wrongful restraint, defamation, and joining an unlawful
assembly. We also scraped the charges faced by candidates from myneta.info, which lists all charges by the Indian
Penal Code (IPC); the most common crimes that MLA candidates committed include: organized armed riots and
other criminal activities (IPC 34; IPC 143; IPC 147-149), physical assault (IPC 323, IPC 341, IPC 353), intimidation
(IPC 506), and property damages (IPC 427). Most serious criminal politicians were charged for offenses that affect
the human body (IPC 299-377) and offenses against property (IPC 378-462).
14Vaishnav (2017) follows a similar approach. Unfortunately, we cannot use data on actual convictions as opposed
to pending charges. Criminal convictions against incumbent politicians are very rare in India and the legal process
very time-consuming.
15To clarify, here we only present five states where criminal politicians are most common, but the following analysis
includes villages from the entire country.
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Full Sample Margin < 1% Margin < 2% Margin < 5%
Criminal Non-criminal Criminal Non-criminal Criminal Non-criminal Criminal Non-criminal
Uttar Pradesh 18.1 10.9 15.8 14.0 16.5 14.4 17.3 14.7
Bihar 17.6 4.9 14.0 4.7 12.6 8.2 12.7 8.6
Maharashtra 16.1 5.8 8.8 14.0 11.7 8.2 13.9 9.5
Andhra Pradesh 7.0 9.3 10.5 9.3 10.7 7.2 8.4 8.2
Jharkhand 7.0 2.5 7.0 4.7 6.8 5.1 6.3 4.7
INC 20.6 32.6 14.0 30.2 21.4 28.9 21.9 28.9
BJP 19.1 20.6 19.3 30.2 14.6 25.8 18.6 21.1
BSP 8.4 5.7 10.5 4.7 9.7 7.2 9.3 8.2
SP 6.2 3.2 1.8 4.7 5.8 3.1 5.5 3.0
IND 5.7 5.1 7.0 2.3 5.8 4.1 6.8 3.9
Below College 70.0 65.0 73.1 60.5 73.5 65.6 71.0 66.1
Above College 30.0 35.0 26.9 39.5 26.5 34.4 29.0 33.9
Male 96.8 90.8 94.7 81.4 95.2 86.6 96.2 90.5
Female 3.2 9.2 5.3 18.6 4.9 13.4 3.8 9.5
GEN 84.1 70.2 82.5 79.1 80.6 80.4 81.4 81.5
SC 8.7 15.5 7.0 9.3 10.7 9.3 10.5 10.8
ST 7.2 14.2 10.5 11.6 8.7 10.3 8.0 7.8
Table 1: Winning criminal politicians versus other politicians.
what we observe for the serious criminal politicians (Table A1 in Supporting Information).
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of criminal candidates. The geographic units are
electoral constituencies before and after the 2008 district delimitation. Criminal candidates are
a common phenomenon across India. Although they tend to come from the large, less developed
states of northern India, no geographic region is without its share of successful criminal candidates.
5 Empirical Analysis
We conduct a regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis to examine the local average treatment
effect (LATE) of candidate criminality on various development outcomes. Drawing on the 2011
Census of India, our dataset has a variety of socioeconomic variables for 586,899 villages across the
entire country. Electoral results are based on official election statistics for state assemblies.16
For causal identification, we focus on close elections in which the winner’s margin of victory
over the runner-up is within 5% of valid votes. We compare constituencies in which either the
winner or the runner-up, but not both, is a criminal candidate. Doing so leaves us with a total
of 4,022 constituency-level election outcomes between 2004 and 2010.17 For robustness, we also
estimate models with 1% and 2% bandwidths. The data on candidate quality are based on affidavits
submitted by candidates, as required by the Election Commission of India.
The unit of analysis is village-election because each village may have more than one election.
16Note the change of constituency boundaries in India after the March 2008 elections in Meghalaya. Using both
administrative records and GIS maps of Indian boundaries, we have assigned every village in the country separately
for pre-2008 and post-2008 constituency.




Figure 1: The distribution of criminal politicians in India. Areas marked in red refer to assembly
constituencies where criminal politicians won. Yellow areas are constituencies represented by non-
criminal politicians. In constituencies marked in gray, either no election was held or no data are
available.
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Given that the outcome variables are only measured in the 2011 census, in some states we have two
measures per village. We cluster standard errors by village to avoid any bias from double-counting
certain observations. Our baseline RDD model is
Yijk = α+ βCRIMINALjk + εijk, (1)
where Yijk refers to an outcome of interest in village i for election j in constituency k. The
coefficient β indicates the local average treatment effect of CRIMINAL, a binary indicator that
shows whether a criminal politician winning the election. Throughout, we report two-way standard
errors clustered by village and constituency so we can take into account that the treatment occurs
at the constituency level while addressing the bias from double-counting.18
Building on Model 1, we add three specifications to address other potential confounding co-
variates. First, we include election-year (YR) and state (STATE ) fixed effects. Second, we add
the forcing variable, the winner’s margin of victory (MOV ) against the first runner-up in a con-
stituency.19 In the same specification, we also include the interaction with the treatment and MOV
to consider differential slopes of the treatment effect of CRIMINAL. Finally, since all of our depen-
dent variables were measured in the 2011 Census, we control for the same outcomes measured in
the 2001 Census. This comprehensive model is
Yijk = βCRIMINALjk+γ1YRj+γ2STATEi+γ3MOVjk+γ4CRIMINALjk×MOVjk+Y2001ijk+εijk,
(2)
where Y2001 refers to the dependent variable measured in 2001.
18Alternatively, we address the concern of duplicated villages, which would otherwise result in the over-
representation of some villages in the sample, by providing the results with a single round of elections. The results
in Section A14 are very similar to our main findings.
19Given our focus on the local RDD, we do not include higher-order polynomials, as they may produce biased
coefficients (Gelman and Imbens, 2014). We estimate, instead, models that begin with the treatment variable alone,
then add election year and state fixed effects, then add a linear local polynomial, and final include pre-treatment




The 2011 Census of India offers detailed data on local infrastructure and household poverty across
different villages in the country. We also consider comparable outcomes from the 2001 Census,
though the regression discontinuity analysis does not require multiple measures over time for causal
identification.
We consider six outcomes in our analysis. The first two focus on the supply of local public
infrastructure; we use two binary variables that respectively indicate whether a village has an
electricity connection and“pucca”roads (i.e., paved roads). The remaining four dependent variables,
ranging between 0 and 1, focus on the average level of poverty and human capital across different
households in a village. The first variable is the share of households that use electricity as the
primary source for lighting. The second variable is literacy rate, measured by the share of literate
population – 7 years or older – in a village. The third variable is the share of households that
have access to treated tap water for drinking. To capture the overall degree of extreme poverty in
a village, we compute the share of households that do not own any assets listed in the census.20
Compared with the first two variables, the second set of outcome variables concern the efficiency
of local public goods at the household level. For instance, a village can have electricity access with
many households remaining unconnected.
In the extended RDD specification, we control for the same outcomes from the 2001 Census to
improve the precision of our estimates. The 2001 outcomes for household electrification and treated
tap water are only available at the village level – whether there are any households benefiting from
this amenity – so they are included as dummy variables. While the 2011 Census includes most
variables from the previous census in 2001, the 2001 Census did not record individual households’
assets. We, therefore, use the share of marginal workers – villagers without permanent jobs – to
measure extreme poverty in a village in 2001.
All our outcomes can be shaped by public investment: road construction, village electrification,
household electrification, poverty alleviation schemes, and access to clean water are all areas of
20The 2011 Census recorded a household lacking assets if it owned none of the following items: radio, television,
computer (or laptop) with Internet connection, landline telephone, mobile phone, bicycle, scooter, or car.
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major activity for Indian states. Given that our theory predicts null effects for infrastructure,
which depends heavily on public investment, any bias from differing importance of state funding
would go against our hypotheses. Of the poverty measures, in turn, household electrification and
education are heavily dependent on state intervention.
5.2 Explanatory Variables
The main explanatory variable is a binary indicator that shows whether a criminal candidate won
the close election in an assembly constituency. We define a winning candidate as a criminal politician
if he or she faced at least one criminal charge prior to the election. To extend the analysis, following
the definition of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), we consider another treatment
variable that indicates if the winner is a serious criminal politician, with similar results (Section A13
shows results when we only focus on candidates with property-related criminal charges, under the
assumption such charges are particularly relevant to corruption). We use an automated algorithm
to scrape information on more than 70,000 contesting candidates in Indian state assembly elections
from National Election Watch, an on-line database affiliated with the ADR, after 2004.21
5.3 Identification Assumptions
For an RDD with a continuous forcing variable, the primary assumption is the discontinuity of
treatment assignment. That is, the assignment of treatment can be reasonably presumed “as if”
random around a defined threshold of the forcing variable. Observations that fall within a small
bandwidth around the threshold, therefore, provide valid counteractions for causal identification.
Using the winner’s margin of victory as the forcing variable, our RD design imposes the assumption
that whether a criminal politician wins a highly contested election occurs at random. In our analysis,
we restrict our samples at three bandwidths of electoral margin: 1%, 2%, and 5%.22
We use two common diagnostic tests. We first study the balance of covariates that could not
be affected by the outcome of close elections. If these covariates are similar across the “treatment”
(i.e., winning criminal candidate) and“control” (i.e., defeated criminal candidate) units, the concern
21See http://www.myneta.info/ for more details.
22In Section A6 (Supporting Information), we find the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidths and
show that they are generally very close to 5%, thus validating our a priori decisions. We also apply different methods
to see if our results vary by different optimal bandwidths (Hyytinen et al., 2018; Calonico et al., 2019); the results
are very similar.
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about non-random electoral results within the bandwidth is assuaged. We compute the differences
in means for the control variables from the 2001 census, other constituency-related covariates (e.g.,
whether a constituency is reserved for the scheduled groups), and candidate characteristics (e.g.,
whether the winner is a woman, whether the winning candidate has received college education).
While candidate characteristics, unlike the other covariates, are not suitable for standard balance
tests, as their correlation with criminality would not violate the identifying assumptions, compar-
ing the treatment and control groups for candidate characteristics is a good way to test whether
our theoretical inferences could be biased by major differences across criminal and non-criminal
candidates.
The differences in means are mostly insignificant, suggesting that criminality is neither corre-
lated with underlying socioeconomic characteristics nor associated with other candidate character-
istics that could explain the outcome. This latter observation is particularly important because
it alleviates concerns about criminality as a proxy for candidate quality more generally: in close
elections, criminal candidates are similar to non-criminal candidates. In some samples, however,
the winning criminal politician is less likely to be a woman. We thus replicate our results in the
appendix controlling for whether the candidate is a female politician (Section A12). See Section
A3 for the balance statistics between the treatment and control observations.23
The imposed discontinuity of treatment assignment can also be questionable if subjects can
self-sort around the threshold. In the context of close elections, this concern is more or less reduced
because it is hardly plausible that candidates can precisely manipulate their margin of victory
around zero. That being said, we conduct the McCrary (2008) density test, the standard technique
for researchers to examine if there exists discontinuity of the forcing variable. In our case, if the RDD
assumption holds, we should see a relatively smooth density distribution of the margin of victory.
If there exists a statistically significant jump at the threshold 0, the validity of our RD design will
be severely compromised as it suggests potential non-random sorting around the discontinuity. We
present the results from the McCrary density test in Section A4. The results suggest that there are
no large or statistically significant discontinuities of the margin of victory around the cutpoint.




Figure 2 summarizes the results based on criminal candidates. The figure shows the point estimates
from four different models for the dependent variables and all three bandwidths (see Section A9
for full regression output). We normalize the coefficients and confidence intervals by the standard
deviation of the data in the control group (i.e., a narrow loss by the criminal candidate in the
relevant bandwidth) to make the estimates comparable. Figure A6 summarizes the estimated
effects of serious criminals; a comparison to Figure 2 shows similar results.24
First, while the estimates for paved roads are all negative, they are mostly statistically insignifi-
cant; the estimates for electricity supply show no clear pattern. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that criminal politicians have neither negative nor positive effects on local infrastructure
construction.
Next, household electrification rates decrease in all except one model under criminal politicians,
and most of the point estimates have narrow confidence intervals. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that criminal politicians undermine poverty alleviation, as household electrification is,
first and foremost, achieved by reducing household connection costs in electrified villages.
Meanwhile, literacy rate decreases in all models with most statistically significant coefficients
at the conventional level. Depending on the model, estimated negative effects on household electri-
fication go up to 15 percentage points and the negative effects on literacy rates up to 11 percentage
points. While these estimates are the extreme bounds and other models produce smaller magni-
tudes, the estimations are overall realistic: India’s rural literacy rate increased by 8.4 percentage
points between the 2001 and 2011 decennial censuses, consistent with the notion that investment
in primary education can generate rapid results in a young population (7 years and older) – and
criminal politicians can hurt such efforts within a decade. Compared to the inconsistency of esti-
mates for infrastructure, the overall pattern is clear: successful criminal candidates have negative
24Figure A6 shows that the effect on power supply of the serious criminal candidates is positive and sometimes
statistically significant when we focus on the sample with the margin of victory smaller than 1%. This finding is
still consistent with our proposed theory – that is, criminal politicians may have the incentive to provide local public






































































































Figure 2: Local average treatment effects of criminal candidates winning close elections with 95%
confidence intervals. The coefficients and confidence intervals are normalized by the standard devi-
ation of the control group (i.e., non-criminal candidate wins by a narrow margin) for comparability
across models (see Section A8 for non-normalized estimates). Model 1 only includes the treatment
variable. Model 2 adds election year and state fixed effects. Model 3 adds electoral margin and
the interaction of electoral margin and treatment. Model 4 adds the 2001 census outcomes as
pre-treatment control variables.
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effects on rural socioeconomic development at the household level. All these patterns can also be
seen in RD scatter plots with local linear controls (Section A5).
The results on treated tap water, nonetheless, are weak. The coefficients are sometimes positive
and sometimes negative, with little evidence of a systematic pattern. One possible reason for the
lacking effect is that the use of treated tap water remains rare in villages, so that only relatively
wealthy households use it: in 2001, only 32.8% of villages had access to tap water. The results are
also weak for lack of assets, as the coefficient is either very close to zero or positive (meaning more
extreme poverty) across the models. This result suggests that criminal politicians have weaker,
if any, negative effects on access to private goods, perhaps because criminal politicians are not a
deterrent to economic growth in general. For example, the diffusion of mobile phones across rural
India has little to do with government policy or politics.
Overall, the results reveal that criminal candidates have clear negative effects on poverty alle-
viation and other rural development efforts, except in the case of infrastructure construction. The
outcomes that are the most affected by criminal politicians are household electrification and liter-
acy rates. The patterns for serious criminals are also consistent with our expectations since serious
crimes are often a reliable proxy for less honesty and integrity. The patterns are also helpful in
rejecting the possible alternative explanation that minor criminal charges (e.g., trespassing) simply
indicate a lack of competence, as being charged with murder or bribery does not suggest simple
human error.
Despite the inclusion of state fixed effects, the results may differ in exceptionally corrupt or poor
states. We conduct a separate analysis in which we divide all observations into two different groups.
The first group of villages consists of those in the “BIMARU” states – Bihar, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and states that used to be part of them – and the second group includes
villages outside these states. Put together by Ashish Bose in the 1980s, the BIMARU states are
known for being much less developed than other states (Sharma, 2015). Some of these states are
famously corrupt (Bose, 2013). We present the results in Section A15.1 (Supporting Information).
While most results are similar to the main findings, criminal politicians appear to hinder the supply
of paved road in BIMARU states. These findings support our argument, as rich states can offer
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criminal politicians stronger incentives to reap from local development projects that focus on the
construction of local infrastructure.
6.2 Political Alignment
Political alignment plays a major role in Indian politics. We test whether criminal politicians
have different effects when they are affiliated to the same political parties as their respective state
chief ministers. If criminal politicians pursue their self-interest by seeking resources from the state
government, it is possible that the effects of criminality are amplified under political alignment.
Political alignment offers the opportunity that criminal politicians exploit to realize personal gains
from illicit activities, including rent-seeking in public works.
The full results are shown in Section A15.3. Overall, political alignment does little to modify
the effects of criminal politicians, with an important exception in the case of road construction
(Figure 3). In this case, criminal politicians without alignment generate worse outcomes. Because
road construction is largely funded by the state, the result is consistent with the notion that aligned
criminal politicians use their connections to secure lucrative contracts in their constituencies, and
then siphon resources through corruption and bribery (e.g., Lehne, Shapiro, and Eynde, 2016).25
This interpretation is consistent with our argument: criminal politicians have no clear-cut effect on
infrastructure projects.
6.3 Criminal Politicians and Road Quality
We consider whether electing criminal politicians will affect the quality of built infrastructure. We
expect an adverse effect because the null effect on road construction stems from a positive scale
effect canceling out a negative quality effect.
In 2000, India launched the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), a nationwide
program seeking to improve road connectivity in the countryside. In addition to allocating funds
for road construction, PMGSY introduces two inspection schemes at the national and state level
25In Table A71, in the sample with the margin of victory smaller than 5%, we find that the interaction of “S
criminal” with “alignment” is positive and statistically significant. This finding suggests that serious criminals are
more likely to secure a village’s power supply when they are aligned with their respective chief ministers. However,
in the same sample, which includes 18,981 observations with a serious criminal politician winning a close election,






















Figure 3: Political alignment of criminal politicians and road construction.
to monitor the quality of the built roads.26 The national inspections are managed by the National
Rural Roads Development Agency (NRRDA) under the Ministry of Rural Development (Thube
and Thube, 2013; Lewis-Faupel et al., 2014). Each scheme assigns a grade to each of the inspected
projects. We downloaded all inspection data between 2004 and 2013.27
Both schemes render the grading decision into one of the three categories: “satisfactory,” “re-
quires improvement,” and “unsatisfactory.” We recode the decision as an ordinal variable from 1
to 3, with 3 denoting “satisfactory,” the best possible outcome. We conduct the RDD analysis to
estimate the effect of criminal politicians winning close elections on road quality. We also estimate
their effect on the number of inspections conducted.
We present our results in Tables 2.28 Panel A shows the results of National Quality Monitoring
(NQM) and Panel B shows those of State Quality Monitoring (SQM). For NQM, we find that
criminal politicians have a statistically significant negative impact on the quality grade of built
roads in the full model. Criminal politicians also appear to exercise a negative influence on the
number of inspections.29
The patterns are consistent with our hypotheses. Criminal politicians undermine not only road
26The inspection includes items such as quality control arrangements, earthworks, side drains, road markings,
surfacing, and pavement conditions.
27See Section A10.
28Table A18 (Supporting Information) shows the results based on serious criminal politicians.
29Section A11 shows suggestive evidence for criminal candidates’ election contributing to more road agreements
and higher rates of non-completion, but the estimates are mostly statistically insignificant.
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Panel A: National Quality Monitoring
Inspection Grading Number of Inspections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Criminal (=1) −0.030 −0.061 −0.506∗∗ −0.507∗∗ −0.023 −0.025 −0.222∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.110) (0.208) (0.209) (0.036) (0.038) (0.083) (0.083)
Electoral margin 0.022 −0.118 −0.119∗ 0.011 −0.047∗ −0.048∗
(0.037) (0.072) (0.072) (0.014) (0.026) (0.026)
Road length (log) −0.024 0.046∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.010)
Criminal:margin 0.177∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.082) (0.082) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant 2.293∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗ 2.483∗∗∗ 2.518∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.145) (0.199) (0.206) (0.028) (0.050) (0.077) (0.077)
State FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Inspections 362 362 362 362 1742 1742 1742 1742
ACs 110 110 110 110 137 137 137 137
Observations 397 397 397 397 1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919
R2 0.0003 0.027 0.045 0.046 0.001 0.007 0.016 0.029
Adjusted R2 −0.002 0.017 0.033 0.031 0.0001 0.005 0.013 0.026
Panel B: State Quality Monitoring
Inspection Grading Number of Inspections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Criminal (=1) 0.069 0.045 −0.096 −0.104 0.084 0.135 −0.489∗ −0.507∗
(0.084) (0.067) (0.151) (0.150) (0.116) (0.127) (0.292) (0.292)
Electoral margin 0.021 −0.021 −0.021 0.062 −0.123 −0.123
(0.024) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.089) (0.089)
Road length (log) 0.030∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.026)
Criminal:margin 0.053 0.055 0.236∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.099) (0.098)
Constant 2.409∗∗∗ 2.124∗∗∗ 2.241∗∗∗ 2.208∗∗∗ 1.843∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 2.279∗∗∗ 2.190∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.101) (0.161) (0.158) (0.086) (0.183) (0.310) (0.309)
State FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Inspections 1712 1712 1712 1712 1742 1742 1742 1742
ACs 136 136 136 136 137 137 137 137
Observations 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919
R2 0.002 0.121 0.123 0.125 0.002 0.026 0.043 0.051
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.120 0.121 0.123 0.001 0.024 0.041 0.048
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: Estimated effect of criminal politicians winning close elections on PMGSY quality mon-
itoring at the national and state level. Inspection grading: satisfaction (=3), need improvement
(=2), and unsatisfactory (=1). Standard errors are clustered by constituencies.
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quality but also road inspections by the national government – probably in an effort to conceal
low-quality projects and the underlying corrupt practices. We find a negative quality effect despite
efforts to prevent inspection. It is likely that without attempts to hide, the negative quality effect
of criminal politicians would be even larger. Bohlken (2018: 5) finds that “incumbents aligned with
the ruling party show a greater ability to deliver infrastructure outputs regardless of whether they
are ministers or ordinary legislators.” Our results add that politicians with criminal backgrounds
are responsible for compromised road quality.
We also explore whether the results differ by political alignment. The results in Table A19
(Supporting Information) are particularly noteworthy: when it comes to SQM, the interaction of
Criminal with Align is always negative and statistically significant in many cases. In other words,
aligned criminal politicians undermine the quality of road construction under PMGSY and, perhaps,
even manage to sabotage quality inspections in their respective states.
6.4 Distributional Effects of Candidate Quality
In this section, we study whether the negative impact of criminal politicians is particularly strong
for the most disadvantaged communities. While the wealthy and privileged of the society can use
coercion or bribery to obtain resources, the lower segments of the social hierarchy lack the status
and connections to do so. In India, the scheduled castes and tribes have been officially indicated
as such groups.
We see no conclusive pattern of villages with scheduled caste populations (see Section A15.2).
Figure 4 shows the marginal effects of electing criminal candidates with different average shares of
scheduled caste (SC) population at the village level for outcome variables in which there is some
evidence of interactive effects. If anything, we find suggestive evidence for a positive interaction:
villages with many scheduled caste people certainly do not suffer more in terms of household
electricity access and literacy rate.
6.5 Gender and Education
We consider two possible alternative explanations for our results (see Section A12 for full regression
output). Our balance statistics suggest a gender imbalance in some samples. While this issue is
26
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(d) Distribution of SC population share
Figure 4: Heterogeneous effects of winning criminal politicians.
27
unlikely to be important because there were very few female candidates in Indian elections, we
replicate our analysis controlling for the candidates’ gender.
We also control for whether the winning candidate has a college degree: although education is
balanced between the treated (i.e., criminal politicians won close elections) and control (i.e., criminal
politicians lost close elections) observations, the literature often uses education as a measure of
candidate quality (e.g., Carnes and Lupu, 2016). The test on education allows us to evaluate the
possibility that criminal candidates are less qualified than non-criminal candidates.
Including these controls does not change our substantive conclusions, as the coefficients remain
unchanged. The associations between gender, education, and socioeconomic outcomes are generally
weak, though it appears that educated politicians are associated with somewhat less poverty in the
villages. Overall, we see little evidence of criminality and other candidate traits being conflated.
6.6 Law and Order
We use official statistics and household surveys to investigate whether criminal politicians’ negative
impact on socioeconomic outcomes can be partially attributed to the reduction in law order. As
Chemin (2012) notes,“[c]riminal politicians may affect consumption by the poorest by increasing the
prevalence of criminality, which disproportionately affects the most vulnerable sections of society.”
If they do not, it is more likely that our findings stem from corruption and a lack of good governance,
independent of changes in crime in society.
First, we analyze district-year data from India’s National Crime Records Bureau on murders
to see if the election of criminal candidates drives crimes. Murders, unlike other crimes, are ideal
for this test because hiding an actual murder from the statistics would be very difficult. Our
instrumental variable analysis shows that the logged number of murders within a district does not
change with the election of criminal candidates (Section A16), suggesting that criminal politicians do
not compromise local law and order. Instead, criminal politicians compromise the implementation
and effectiveness of poverty-reduction policies.
Next, we examine how criminal politicians influence perceived crime, community conflict, and
confidence in various social institutions. Drawing from two rounds of the India Human Development
28
Survey (IHDS),30 we estimate the effect of electing criminal politicians on these outcomes with an
instrumental variables approach (Section A17). Again, the results are weak: the election of criminal
politicians does not seem to induce changes in these outcomes.
7 Conclusion
We show that criminal politicians have heterogeneous effects on the different aspects of rural devel-
opment in India – when criminal candidates win close elections, they reduce household electrifica-
tion and literacy rates, but they do not impede public infrastructure. Meanwhile, they undermine
poverty alleviation more through corruption than through the deterioration of law and order. The
fact that criminal politicians hinder road construction when they are unaligned with the state gov-
ernment suggests that criminality has two countervailing effects on infrastructure: while corruption
reduces efficiency and quality of projects, self-interested criminal politicians cancel out some of this
adverse impact by working hard to provide lucrative projects.
Therefore, criminal politicians exhibit a concerning imperfection in real-world democratic poli-
ties, but the cost they incur is not straightforward. If criminal politicians do invest in local infras-
tructure, they may not undermine economic growth on a grand scale. But if criminal politicians at
the same time neglect investment in education and other basic human capital, their electoral victory
can impede the prospects of “inclusive growth” (see Drèze and Sen, 2002). The neglect of providing
essential household amenities and alleviating extreme poverty raises a troubling possibility that
even if criminal politicians can generate growth, they perpetuate and exacerbate inequalities in
developing societies.
Economic development depends on improving infrastructure, building human capital, creat-
ing social security systems for the poor, and solving many other problems that plague developing
countries. Our findings suggest that reducing the progress in addressing these problems into an
overarching indicator, such as GDP per capita, can leave us with a simplistic and misleading under-
standing. Scholars of the political economy of development should begin systematically theorizing
about the role of governance in shaping different outcomes.
A promising direction for future research on criminal candidates pertains to strategies to com-
30The IHDS Project selected nationally representative samples in both rounds. See ihds.info.
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municate to poor voters the damage that criminal politicians can cause. Today, criminal politicians
win elections by leveraging the financial resources of their supporters, by coercing recalcitrant
voters, and by promising to protect co-ethnic voters against other groups. Is there a way to com-
municate effectively to the rural poor that criminal politicians have large negative effects on the
pillars of rural development, such as literacy? Could non-criminal candidates use this information
to their advantage in electoral campaigns?
Our results call for more attention to how voters assess candidate quality. The criminality of
candidates is not a secret to voters in developing countries such as India, but this awareness so
far has not prevented criminals from winning elections – on the contrary, studies such as Vaishnav
(2017) suggest that criminal candidates may even reap benefits from their rough reputation. A
theoretically insightful and practically relevant direction for research would be to examine whether
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